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This issue collects a part of the papers presented at the conference titled “Building 
Consensus. Rhetoric between Democracy and Conflict” held in Palermo in April 
2015. The aim was to encourage an interdisciplinary investigation of the role of 
rhetoric and discursive processes in the realization of democracy and its eventual 
degenerations.  
The contemporary debate on this topic seems to be polarized between two different 
conceptions of democracy: the “deliberative” one and the “agonistic” one. The first 
one is related to the classical tradition that considers Habermas as its reference point. 
It emphasizes the role of rational deliberation as a means to produce a legitimate and 
binding consensus. In contrast, the second one draws its inspiration from C. Schmitt, 
and considers conflict and disagreement as unavoidable conditions of democratic 
life. Despite their obvious differences, these two theoretical models have a 
conception of rhetoric in common that is subjected to, or at least excluded from, the 
full exercise of argumentative rationality. Nevertheless, an interpretation of rhetoric 
that includes the logical-argumentative dimension in the rhetorical domain is 
possible. In this way, the recovery of rhetoric, considered both as a practice and as a 
theory of persuasive speech, may shed light on the role of discursive processes in 
building consensus, and thus may allow a revision of the dialectical tension between 
the pairs of concepts that the debate tends to focus on: normative/descriptive, 
rational/irrational, agreement/conflict. 
To better understand the role that rhetoric can play in this debate, it is useful to 
explain our idea of rhetoric. Indeed, despite several attempts to revaluate this 
discipline, the word “rhetoric” has had a negative connotation to date. Indeed in 
many modern languages, when using the word “rhetoric” the speaker feels almost 
obliged to add the attribute “good”, implying in this way that the term “rhetoric” 
alone refers to a fundamentally negative phenomenon. The general attitude towards 
rhetoric tends to associate it to a complex of discursive strategies oriented towards 
manipulating the interlocutor.  
Our idea of rhetoric is completely different from this negative framework. It is rooted 
in the Aristotelian perspective and therefore by the term rhetoric we mean the 
theoretical reflection about the persuasive discourse. In the case of this conference 
there was a specific interest in applying this theoretical reflection to the sphere of the 
public discourse. 
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In particular, our focus was the agonistic dimension of the public debate. Indeed, one 
of the most relevant aspects in this debate is precisely the role of conflict. The 
underlying question is: in order to realize a very democracy, is conflict something to 
avoid by all means or is it something indispensable for democracy itself? Regarding 
this dilemma, the rhetorical approach seems to be the most useful to consider conflict 
as an internal and constitutive element of democracy. In this perspective, it is just the 
dialectic consensus/conflict that feeds public debate. 
This rhetorical approach appears to be particularly fruitful, inasmuch as it allows an 
attempt to overcome the conceptual polarizations mentioned before or, at least, to 
approach them in a smoother way. 
Indeed, in the Aristotelian perspective, there is no choice to make between rhetoric 
with a “logical-argumentative core”, and rhetoric with an “emotional-pathemic core”. 
This dichotomy is actually artificial. The very famous triad of Aristotelian rhetorical 
proofs (pisteis) – ethos, pathos and logos – is a clear evidence that Aristotle does not 
need to put back together the emotional and the logical component, because they 
coexist from the very beginning. Indeed, ethos is the proof based on the character of 
the speaker, pathos is the one based on the emotion of the audience and logos is the 
proof based on the speech itself. Although each of these proofs includes to a certain 
degree both the intellectual and the desiderative components, ethos and pathos 
mainly involve the latter, while logos mainly refers to the former. In any case, 
according to Aristotle, the speaker, in order to persuade his audience, must take into 
account all these proofs together. In fact, this is the only way to enable the audience 
to make a choice. This is one of the reasons why the rhetorical approach we propose, 
considered both as a practice and as a theory of persuasive speech, may shed light on 
the role of discursive processes in building consensus. 
Another dichotomy this approach can help us to problematize is the one – typical of 
the contemporary debate – between a normative approach and a descriptive one.  
The first one focuses on what we should do when we argue, while the second one 
analyses what we actually do when we argue. The followers of the normative 
approach tend to identify “rational” rules able to guarantee the agreement that, in 
their perspective, largely means consensus; instead, the followers of the descriptive 
approach are accused of including in their theories the emotional aspects of the 
argumentative processes, considered by the normativists as irrational and fallacious 
arguments. 
Also in this case the Aristotelian approach seems to be fruitful. Aristotle is in a 
certain way a normativist, but we would say in a more sophisticated manner: the 
rules he proposes to follow are flexible because they take into account the real and 
concrete persuasive practices and, besides, in the Aristotelian perspective, as we have 
seen before, the emotional appeal is not by itself fallacious or negative. 
Given this background, when deciding to organize this conference, one of our main 
aim was to stimulate a discussion on this topic from different points of view. By 
“different points of view” we mean both different disciplines and different 
methodological approaches within the same field.  
A simple look at the index of this volume is enough to see that our expectations were 
completely met. Indeed, the papers collected here approach the topic of consensus 
following different perspectives and also analysing several and multiple aspects. 
Some papers focus on the ancient roots of this debate, in particular in the Greek 
world; some focus on the role played by disagreement and conflict and their relation 
with democracy; others are concentrated on the link between linguistic aspects and 
social roles; some others analyse specific case-studies. Not only the issues, but also 
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the disciplinary approaches are diverse: rhetoric, philosophy of language, cognitive 
science, argumentation theory, sociolinguistics, philosophy of science, discourse 
analysis, economics. This variety in itself is a clear sign of the vivacity of this debate, 
and the comparison among different disciplines and approaches is stimulating and 
fruitful. For all these reasons, we think that this issue of RIFL can represent a starting 
point for further research on this complex and intriguing topic. 
 
